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ABSTRACT
Despite displaying a statistically significant optimism bias, analysts’ earnings
forecasts are an important input to investors’ valuation models. Understanding
the possible reasons for any bias is important if information is to be extracted
from earnings forecasts and used optimally by investors. Extant research into
the shape of analysts’ loss functions explains optimism bias as resulting from
analysts minimizing the mean absolute forecast error under symmetric, linear
loss functions. When the distribution of earnings outcomes is skewed, optimal
forecasts can appear biased. In contrast, research into analysts’ economic incen-
tives suggests that positive and negative earnings forecast errors made by ana-
lysts are not penalized or rewarded symmetrically, suggesting that asymmetric
loss functions are an appropriate characterization. To reconcile these findings,
we exploit results from economic theory relating to the Linex loss function
to discriminate between the symmetric linear loss and the asymmetric loss
explanations of analyst forecast bias. Under asymmetric loss functions opti-
mal forecasts will appear biased even if earnings outcomes are symmetric.
Our empirical results support the asymmetric loss function explanation. Fur-
ther analysis also reveals that forecast bias varies systematically across firm
characteristics that capture systematic variation in the earnings forecast error
distribution. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
KEY WORDS asymmetric loss functions; earnings forecast bias; financial
analysts; Linex
INTRODUCTION
Financial analysts’ forecasts of corporate earnings are an important input to investors’ valuation mod-
els, despite extensive research from a variety of countries and time periods suggesting that such fore-
casts are irrational: analysts’ earnings forecasts appear to be both biased and inefficient (e.g. DeBondt
and Thaler, 1990; Brown, 1993; Capstaff et al., 1995, 1998, 2001). More recent research suggests
that the statistical bias and inefficiency of earnings forecasts could in fact be rational and due to the
* Correspondence to: Mark A. Clatworthy, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK. E-mail:
clatworthyma@cf.ac.uk
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loss functions underpinning analysts’ forecast choices (e.g. see Ramnath et al., 2008, for a review).
An analyst’s ‘optimal’ earnings forecast will depend on the subjective probability distribution of
prospective forecast errors and on the loss function. Therefore, in order to interpret and use earn-
ings forecasts in company valuation, investors should understand analysts’ loss functions and the
resulting properties of earnings forecasts (Lambert, 2004). This paper contributes to the literature by
presenting evidence indicating that the bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts is related to asymmetric
loss functions.
Our results contrast with arguments elsewhere in the literature that it is asymmetry in the distri-
bution of realized earnings outcomes, not in financial analysts’ loss functions, that drives analyst
forecast bias. In particular, Gu and Wu (2003) argue that forecast bias is only irrational under
quadratic loss and that if analysts have symmetric, linear loss functions then biased earnings fore-
casts can be rational. They find that earnings forecast bias is associated with skewness in the
distribution of earnings, which is consistent with the presence of symmetric linear loss functions
where analysts minimize the mean absolute forecast error. Consistent with a linear symmetric loss
function, Basu and Markov (2004) find that the null hypothesis of rationality is rejected less fre-
quently when least absolute deviation regression is used in place of ordinary least squares regression.
However, they do not test the symmetric linear function explanation of forecast bias against the
alternative that analysts have asymmetric loss functions and, as noted by Lambert (2004), Basu and
Markov (2004) provide limited evidence to support the premise that analysts’ loss functions are linear
and symmetric.
The idea that financial analysts bear asymmetric losses for positive and negative earnings forecast
errors (i.e. under- and over-predictions of earnings realizations, respectively) receives strong support
in prior research into analysts’ incentives and the institutional environment in which they produce
their forecasts.1 Asymmetric costs and benefits associated with analyst forecast errors can arise as
a result of the relation between sell-side securities firms and buy-side investors. For example, evi-
dence suggests that optimistic earnings forecasts are profitable to sell-side firms because they are
more likely to result in trading commission (Jackson, 2005).2 Asymmetric costs and benefits associ-
ated with positive and negative forecast errors might also arise as a result of the business relationships
between analysts (or the sell-side securities firms they work for) and the companies that analysts
follow. For example, evidence suggests that when investment banking ties exist between a com-
pany and the securities firms employing analysts, analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic
(Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998) and analysts are less likely to issue timely
unfavourable forecasts (O’Brien et al., 2005). Consistent with these studies, Hong and Kubik (2003)
report that, after controlling for forecast accuracy, analysts who issue more optimistic forecasts are
more likely to have improved career prospects.3
A further incentive for analysts to issue optimistic forecasts arises because company management
potentially supplies useful information to analysts. Lim (2001) reports that company managers may
1 Asymmetric loss functions stem from human evaluations of probabilities and the costs and benefits of associated outcomes
not being strictly independent of each other—a notion firmly established in the psychology literature (see Weber, 1994). Due
to the appeal of the idea that over-predictions and under-predictions are not penalized equally in many decision-making
contexts, asymmetric loss is an area receiving increasing attention in the forecasting literature more generally
(e.g. see Elliott et al., 2005; Demetrescu, 2007; Patton and Timmerman, 2007a,b).
2 Jackson (2005) also shows that in the presence of asymmetric information about analyst motives analysts’ response to such
incentives can also be reconciled with their need to maintain credibility.
3 See also Ashiya (2009) for a discussion of how employers’ views may create biases in macroeconomic forecasts.
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restrict access to valuable information if analysts issue pessimistic earnings forecasts.4 Significant
regulatory attention has been directed towards these issues (such as the 2004 guidance on conflicts
of interest in sell side research issued in the UK by the Financial Services Authority and Regulation
Fair Disclosure in the USA), though the evidence on the effectiveness of these interventions is mixed
(e.g. Bradshaw, 2009a; Barniv et al., 2009).
Smith Raedy et al. (2006) exploit asymmetric loss functions in understanding the properties of
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts; however, their focus is on possible inefficiency of analysts’
forecasts and, in particular, on evidence of under-reaction to prior forecast errors.5 They present evi-
dence consistent with analysts facing asymmetric reputational costs for forecast inaccuracy, where
the costs depend on whether or not forecast errors confirm as correct the direction of analysts’ ear-
lier reactions to news. They demonstrate that the degree of under-reaction increases with the forecast
horizon, in a similar manner to the positive relation between optimism bias and forecast horizon doc-
umented by Kang et al. (1994). In contrast to Smith Raedy et al. (2006), our paper focuses on bias
(rather than inefficiency) in analysts’ forecasts, and the extent to which it can be attributed to analysts
having asymmetric loss functions.
Economic theory predicts that when analysts have asymmetric loss functions (more specifically,
the Linex loss function in our case), the degree of rational bias in forecasts will be related to the
expected variance of forecast errors; however, the bias will not be related to the expected variance of
earnings forecast errors when analysts have symmetric loss functions. Hence our analysis allows us
to test the hypothesis that forecast bias results from asymmetric loss functions against the alternative
of symmetric loss functions.
In contrast to research suggesting that analysts’ loss functions are symmetric, our results are consis-
tent with analysts minimizing asymmetric loss functions. More specifically, the sign of the coefficient
on expected forecast error variance in our tests allow us to reject the symmetric linear loss function
explanation and suggests that positive forecast errors (pessimistic forecasts) are penalized more heav-
ily than negative forecast errors (optimistic forecasts). This result is in accordance with the research
into analysts’ economic incentives affecting the earnings forecasting task (discussed above) and con-
trasts with the conclusions of Gu and Wu (2003) and Basu and Markov (2004) that analysts are
penalized equally for positive and negative earnings forecast errors under symmetric linear loss. We
also analyse the determinants of earnings forecast errors through an analysis of portfolios formed
on the basis of the book-to-price ratio and market capitalisation—two firm characteristics that are
known determinants of earnings forecast bias and that are also related to variance and skewness in
earnings. We find that forecast bias is also associated with book-to-price and market capitalization,
but the dominant role of expected forecast error variance in explaining forecast bias is robust across
these characteristic portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theory
of asymmetric loss functions and derive empirical predictions based on the Linex loss function that
distinguish between linear and asymmetric loss. The third section discusses our empirical research
4 See Bradshaw (2009b) for a detailed discussion of research into analysts’ incentives and the role they may play in explaining
empirical regularities in this literature.
5 In research developed concurrently with an earlier version of this paper, Markov and Tan (2005) also find evidence of
asymmetric loss employing the approach of Elliott et al. (2005). This approach effectively reverse engineers the forecast
to recover the loss function shape parameter. However, whether the asymmetry is consistent with optimism bias depends
on the specification of the model they estimate. The same approach of ‘backing out’ loss function parameters has also
been employed to investigate macroeconomic growth forecasts (e.g. Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis, 2008; Patton and
Timmermann, 2007b).
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design and describes our dataset. In the fourth section we report our empirical results. Finally, in the
fifth section we present our conclusions and suggestions for further research.
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS’ LOSS FUNCTIONS AND EARNINGS FORECAST BIAS
If financial analysts have quadratic loss functions and attempt to minimize the mean squared error
(MSE), then their optimal earnings forecast is the conditional mean (expected value) of the earnings
distribution and observed forecast bias represents evidence of analyst irrationality. Under asymmetric
loss, however, unbiasedness—like many other commonly used optimality properties of MSE—is an
unreliable benchmark for the empirical evaluation of forecasts (Patton and Timmermann, 2007a).
While there are strong suggestions in the existing literature that analysts’ incentives are likely to
lead to asymmetric costs associated with positive and negative earnings forecast errors, the limited
research that studies analysts’ loss functions as an explanation for analyst forecast bias has advanced
linear symmetric loss functions as an explanation of earnings forecast bias (Gu and Wu, 2003;
Basu and Markov, 2004).
If the subjective probability distribution of earnings is skewed, rational forecasts with symmetric
loss functions are biased, unless the loss function is quadratic (Granger, 1969; Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu
and Markov, 2004). In contrast to the quadratic loss function case, rational analysts with symmetric
linear loss functions minimize the mean absolute value of anticipated forecast errors (MAE). Similar
to quadratic loss functions, symmetric linear loss functions weight equally positive and negative fore-
cast errors of the same magnitude, though in contrast to quadratic loss functions, symmetric linear
loss functions attach relatively lower weight to more extreme forecast errors.6
With symmetric linear loss functions the optimal forecast is the conditional median of the earnings
distribution and the expected value of the median forecast error is zero. The mean forecast error will
differ from zero and earnings forecasts will be biased only if the conditional mean and the conditional
median differ. In other words, if analysts’ loss functions are symmetric, then the optimal forecast bias
depends on skewness in the distribution of earnings, but not on the variance of earnings. Conversely,
as Patton and Timmermann (2007a, p. 888) show, optimal forecasts are unbiased only when both the
forecast variable is distributed symmetrically and the loss function is symmetric, i.e. under conditions
of ‘double symmetry’.
The precise properties of forecast errors and the determinants of the optimal bias will depend
on both the distribution of earnings and on the functional form and parameters of the loss function
(Keane and Runkle, 1998; Elliott et al., 2005; Patton and Timmermann, 2007a). However, a general
result is that under asymmetric loss functions the optimal degree of forecast bias will depend on the
expected variance of the distribution of forecast errors and on higher moments of the forecast error
distribution (Granger, 1969; Patton and Timmermann, 2007a).
Analytical results on the dependence between optimal forecast bias and forecast error variance can
be obtained by assuming specific functional form for the loss function. Christofferson and Diebold
(1996, 1997) analyze optimal forecast bias under the Linex loss function and assuming conditional
normality of the forecast error distribution (Varian, 1974; Zellner, 1986). The Linex loss function
relaxes the assumption of constant marginal cost of forecast errors in the Lin-Lin specification and
allows for asymmetry of marginal cost (Varian, 1974; Zellner, 1986).
6 Though Granger (1969) proposes a piecewise linear (Lin-Lin) loss function that weights positive and negative forecast errors
of similar magnitude differently.
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Assume that the variable to be forecast is earnings at time t , denoted yt . The Linex loss function
has the following form:
L D e
˛xt  ˛xt  1
˛2
(1)
where ˛ is a constant parameter and xt is the forecast error at time t , defined as xt  yt  ft , where
ft is the forecast. The shape parameter ˛ determines the degree of asymmetry while its sign
determines the direction of the asymmetry. A convenient property of the Linex loss function is that it
nests the quadratic loss function as ˛ ! 0.7
Under the Linex loss function, optimistic forecasts (negative forecast errors) are more costly than
pessimistic forecasts (positive forecast errors) when ˛ < 0. In this case, the loss is approximately
exponential in x if x < 0, and approximately linear in x if x > 0. Conversely, where ˛ > 0, loss is
exponential to the right of the origin and linear to the left. In this case, pessimistic forecasts (positive
forecast errors) are more costly than optimistic forecasts (negative forecast errors).
Assume initially that earnings, yt , are generated by a conditional Gaussian process. Christofferson
and Diebold (1996, 1997) show that under the Linex loss function (1), the optimal h-period-ahead
forecast, ft ,tCh, is given by





where Et.tCh/ is the expectation of the mean of ytCh conditional on information at time t (and is
the optimal forecast under quadratic loss) and Et.2tCh/ is the expectation of the conditional error
variance over the h periods. Expression (2) tells us that the optimal forecast for a rational analyst
with an asymmetric loss function, given by the Linex function (1), differs from the conditional mean,
i.e. the forecast is biased.8 It is optimal for the analyst to produce optimistic forecasts if ˛ > 0.





tCh/ C ´t (3)
where ´t is a zero mean moving average error process of order h  1. Note also that if the condi-
tional variance of the forecast error is time varying then optimal forecasts exhibit time-varying bias,
conditional on the time-varying forecast error variance.
Expressions (2) and (3) indicate that the optimal bias under asymmetric loss depends positively on
the loss function parameter, ˛, and on the variance of the forecast error. The optimal forecast expres-
sion (2) assumes that the outcome (earnings) series, yt ,, is a conditional Gaussian process. If we relax
this assumption, it is possible to show that the optimal forecast and the forecast bias depend on both
the variance and the skewness of the forecast error process. For example, Christodoulakis (2005)
derives a closed-form solution assuming non-normal distributions in the form of the Gram–Charlier










 C ´t (4)
7 As ˛ ! 0, the numerator and the denominator of (1) tend to zero. Consequently, as ˛ ! 0, we employ L’Hospital’s rule to
obtain the quadratic form.
8 Patton and Timmermann (2007a) also show that optimal forecasts under Linex are biased for nonlinear data-generating pro-
cesses. Furthermore, they show that other optimality properties under quadratic loss do not hold in the context of the Linex
loss function. For instance, non-zero autocovariances in one-step-ahead forecast errors are shown to exist and the variance of
the forecast error is sometimes a decreasing function of the forecast horizon.
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where ´t is a moving average error process, Et.3tCh/ is the expectation of conditional skewness
of the forecast error and G is a nonlinear, positive function of both the conditional variance and the
conditional skewness of the forecast error (see Appendix for the proof).
Expressions (3) and (4) have important empirical implications, given that the distribution of earn-
ings forecast errors is non-normal (e.g. Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). Under asymmetric loss, if
˛ > 0 then forecast bias is expected to depend positively on the variance of the forecast error. The
above analysis also predicts that forecast errors will be positively related to skewness, although the
association will be weak if the magnitude of ˛ is small. This implies that a test of whether analysts’
loss functions are asymmetric is to examine dependence between forecast errors and proxies for
the conditional variance and conditional skewness of forecast errors. If only skewness is a significant
determinant of forecast errors then this is consistent with analysts minimizing absolute forecast errors.
If the forecast error variance is a significant determinant of forecast errors, then the hypothesis that
analysts minimize absolute forecast error can be rejected in favour of an asymmetric loss function,
under the maintained assumption of rational expectations. Depending on the functional form of the




We assume that loss functions adjust for any scale-related component of ‘raw’ earnings per share fore-
cast errors and that the price-scaled earnings forecast error is the relevant input to the loss function.10
However, while our main tests employ price-scaled forecast errors, in unreported sensitivity tests we
also obtained results using unscaled data using simulation techniques that allow for heteroscedasticity
and non-normality. Our main estimating equation is as follows:
ERRORit D b0 C 1ERRVARit C 2ERRSKEWit C "it (5)
where ERROR is defined as actual quarterly earnings minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly
earnings issued within 90 days of the earnings announcement, scaled by beginning-of-period
stock price. Although analysts’ loss functions may vary systematically in the cross-section
(e.g. Lambert, 2004), our use of the consensus as a proxy for the marginal or representative analyst
is consistent with prior research in this area (e.g. Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004).11
We measure error variance (ERRVAR) as the unstandardized variance of price-scaled forecast errors
(multiplied by 100) in the preceding eight periods. Similarly, we measure skewness (ERRSKEW) as
the sum of the cubed deviations from the mean price-scaled error for the eight quarters prior to quarter
t , multiplied by 100.
To allow comparability with prior empirical research, we also augment regression (1) by includ-
ing a number of control variables capturing other potential determinants of forecast bias: lnMVAL
9 Although Gu and Wu (2003) include measures of earnings variability and forecast variability as control variables in their test
of the MAE loss function, we include the variance of the forecast error as the central test of an asymmetric loss function. We
note that theoretically it is the moments of forecast errors that are relevant determinants of any bias, and not the distribution
of the variable to be forecast (i.e. earnings) per se.
10 For example, suppose that intrinsic value is a constant multiple of forecast earnings per share. The per share intrinsic value
estimation error is proportional to the scaled forecast error and the relevant input to the loss function will be price-scaled
forecast errors.
11 We also conduct robustness tests using individual forecasts. These tests are discussed further below.
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is the natural logarithm of market value at the beginning of quarter t and is included to control
for the possibility that analysts issue more biased forecasts for smaller companies, e.g. to obtain
access to management where less information is available (Francis and Willis, 2001). lnANFLL
is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing forecasts for firm i in quarter t and allows
for the possibility that forecasts are more optimistic for firms that attract higher analyst following
(e.g., Das et al., 1998). We also include LOSS as an indicator variable (equal to 1 if the consensus
forecast of earnings is negative, zero otherwise) because it has been argued that forecasts of losses
are more optimistic (e.g. Duru and Reeb, 2002). SUE1 and SUE2 are included to control for analyst
under-reaction (e.g. Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992) and are defined as, respectively, the one-period
and two-period lagged earnings surprise based on a seasonal random walk model. ERROR, SUE1 and
SUE2 are scaled by stock price in the month preceding quarter t .
Data
Owing to data requirements (particularly the need for a sufficiently long time series of earnings and
forecasts for each firm to obtain measures of error variance and skewness), our sample is for US firms
drawn from the I/B/E/S detail history files (which have been found to be more accurate than other
sources of earnings forecasts—see Ramnath et al., 2005) and from Compustat for the period 1983–
2008. Individual analysts’ quarterly earnings per share forecasts, actual earnings per share, earnings
announcement dates and stock price data are obtained from I/B/E/S. We require each firm to have at
least eight consecutive quarters’ actual earnings and forecast data in order to generate our measures of
forecast error variance and skewness. Data for the book-to-market ratio are obtained from Compustat.
In order to remove potential data errors, we winsorize the error and earnings related variables at
the 1st and 99th percentiles, in line with previous research (e.g. Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). Our
results are robust to alternative outlier deletion procedures (e.g. removing observations in the 5th and
95th percentiles).
Descriptive statistics
Our final sample comprises 100,160 firm quarters for 5,101 firms. Table I, panel A, provides
summary statistics for our sample. In line with prior research (e.g. Basu and Markov, 2004), the
sample-wide distribution of forecast errors is negatively skewed, with the mean forecast error being
negative, indicating an optimism bias (which is also in line with the European evidence reported
in Capstaff et al., 2001) and the median forecast error being slightly positive. Our measures of
firm-specific expected error variance and expected error skewness have coefficients of variation of,
respectively, around 4.11 and 7.25 while ERRSKEW is negative on average, consistent with expec-
tations. In respect of the control variables, the descriptive statistics for LOSS and FLLW show that
approximately 10% of the firms in our sample were forecast to make a loss and the average num-
ber of analysts following each firm in quarter t is 9. Panel B of Table I provides reassurance that
the forecast error distribution in our sample is broadly consistent with the distribution reported in
prior literature by comparing our sample with that in Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003). The comparison
shows that the level of optimism in our sample is lower, as measured by the mean forecast error of
0.078 versus 0.126 and the median of 0.021 versus 0.000); overall, however, the two samples are
similar, despite the forecast data being from different data sources and our data covering a longer
time period.
Panel C of Table I reports the full sample correlations between variables. Particularly noteworthy
is the negative correlation of 0.8411 between ERRVAR and ERRSKEW. This is partly attributable
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Table I. Panel A: Descriptive statistics (n = 100,160)
Variable Mean Median SD Skewness
ERROR 0.0776 0.0214 1.0116 4.55
ERRVAR 0.0927 0.0034 0.4271 6.75
ERRSKEW 0.0036 0.0000 0.0261 8.12
MVAL (mil $) 6060 1272 39237 201.60
ANFLL 9.07 6.00 8.6064 2.47
LOSS 0.1021 0.00 0.3028 2.63
SUE1 0.0164 0.1584 1.7874 0.95
SUE2 0.0310 0.1619 1.7297 0.88
Panel B: Comparison of forecast error (ERROR) distribution with Abarbanell and Lehavy’s (2003) sample
Our sample Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003)
(N = 100,160) (N = 33,548)
Mean 0.078 0.126
Median 0.021 0.000
% positive 55% 48%
% negative 38% 40%
% zero 7% 12%
5th percentile 1.068 1.333
10th percentile 0.492 0.653
25th percentile 0.084 0.149
75th percentile 0.142 0.137
90th percentile 0.409 0.393
95th percentile 0.725 0.684
Panel C: Correlation coefficients
ERROR ERRVAR ERRSKEW lnMVAL lnANFLL LOSS SUE1
ERRVAR 0.1606
ERRSKEW 0.1409 0.8411
lnMVAL 0.1122 0.1691 0.1158
lnANFLL 0.0385 0.0815 0.0601 0.5395
LOSS 0.1380 0.1781 0.0993 0.2282 0.0683
SUE1 0.1687 0.0152 0.0432 0.0873 0.0304 0.2212
SUE2 0.1155 0.0362 0.0477 0.0957 0.0388 0.1908 0.4635
Note: In panel C, we compare our sample with that of Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003). Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) use
the Zacks database from 1985 to 1998; we use I/B/E/S from 1983 to 2008. Both samples are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles.
Indicates significance at the 0.001 level.
to the estimation of correlation coefficients over the full panel when there is time series dependence
in these instruments due to the common information used in estimating adjacent time series observa-
tions. Nevertheless, the negative correlation suggests the possibility that skewness serves as a proxy
for variance in prior research. Since dependence of the forecast error on error variance is the key
empirical prediction that distinguishes the symmetric (linear) loss explanation of forecast bias from
the asymmetric loss explanation, this characteristic of the data points to the importance of controlling
for variance in evaluating these two competing explanations.
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RESULTS
Main regression results
Our main regression results are reported in Table II. We report our three main models (models 1–3),
which include one or both of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW; we then report these models with con-
trol variables in models 4–6. In view of the non-normality in the distribution of forecast errors in
Table II. Price-deflated forecast error regressions
Model 1:
ERRORit D b0 C 1ERRVARit C "it
Model 2:
ERRORit D b0 C 1ERRVARit C 2ERRSKEWit C "it
Model 3:
ERRORit D b0 C 2ERRSKEWit C "it
Model 4:
ERRORit D b0 C 1ERRVARit C b1ln MVALit C b2ln ANFLLit C b3LOSSit C b4SUE1it C b5SUE2it C "it
Model 5:
ERRORit D b0 C 1ERRVARit C 2ERRSKEWit C b1ln MVALit C b2ln ANFLLit C b3LOSSit C b4SUE1it
C b5SUE2it C "it
Model 6:
ERRORit D b0 C 2ERRSKEWit C b1ln MVALit C b2ln ANFLLit C b3LOSSit C b4SUE1it C b5SUE2it C "it
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 0.0424‡ 0.0433‡ 0.0579‡ 0.3022‡ 0.3047‡ 0.3426‡
(9.97) (9.87) (13.03) (12.87) (12.92) (13.91)
[13.13] [13.36] [18.13] [20.38] [20.53] [23.23]
ERRVAR 0.3805‡ 0.3412‡ — 0.3216‡ 0.2784‡ —
(9.72) (4.96) — (8.63) (4.10) —
[51.51] [24.98] — [43.28] [20.29] —
ERRSKEW — 0.7631 5.4518‡ — 0.8263 4.5899‡
— (0.73) (9.03) — (0.82) (8.18)
— [3.42] [45.04] — [3.75] [38.34]
lnMVAL — — — 0.0438‡ 0.0441‡ 0.0484‡
— — — (12.87) (12.91) (13.45)
— — — [18.98] [19.10] [20.98]
lnANFLL — — — 0.0229‡ 0.0230‡ 0.0237‡
— — — (4.66) (4.68) (4.69)
— — — [5.68] [5.71] [5.85]
LOSS — — — 0.2129‡ 0.2171‡ 0.2539‡
— — — (8.02) (8.06) (9.12)
— — — [19.52] [19.80] [23.43]
SUE1 — — — 0.0750‡ 0.0746‡ 0.0717‡
— — — (13.12) (12.84) (12.73)
— — — [37.95] [37.63] [36.21]
SUE2 — — — 0.0181‡ 0.0179‡ 0.0175‡
— — — (3.09) (3.07) (3.00)
— — — [8.90] [8.83] [8.59]
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Table II. Continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
R2 0.0258 0.0259 0.0199 0.0638 0.0639 0.0600
F - value 94.46 48.70 81.56 97.49 85.34 93.84
N 100,160 100,160 100,160 100,160 100,160 100,160
Notes:
Absolute tstatistics based on firm-clustered standard errors are in parentheses; OLS t -statistics are in square brackets.
ERROR is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within
90 days of the earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, multiplied by 100.
ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous eight quarters’ forecast errors, multiplied by 100.
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous eight quarters’ forecast errors, multiplied by 100.
lnMVAL is the natural log of market value of common equity at the beginning of the quarter (in $ millions).
lnANFLL is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing forecasts for each firm in the quarter the forecast falls in.
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the consensus forecast of earnings is negative, zero otherwise.
SUE1 and SUE2 are the price-deflated seasonal unexpected earnings from a random walk at quarters t  1 and t  2,
respectively, multiplied by 100.
 Indicates coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests based on firm-clustered
standard errors.
Table I, the possibility exists that inferences are sensitive to heteroscedasticity and non-normality in
regression errors.12 Recent research also points to the need to control for cross-section and time series
dependence in panel datasets (Petersen, 2008). Therefore we report both OLS t-statistics (as in Gu
and Wu, 2003) and t-statistics based on Rogers’ (1993) ‘clustered’ standard errors.13 Petersen (2008)
finds standard errors clustered by firm to be unbiased in the presence of time series correlation within
firms, in contrast to OLS and Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions, which may be downwardly biased
in panel datasets.
Table II indicates that the clustered tstatistics, based on standard errors adjusted to allow for
time series dependence in firm residuals, are often very much lower than the OLS tstatistics, and
inferences regarding the significance of ERRSKEW are sensitive to the choice of test statistic. We
therefore rely on the more conservative clustered t-statistics where relevant. Models 3 and 6 reveal a
significant positive association between ERROR and ERRSKEW when ERRVAR is excluded. Results
for models 1 and 3 indicate that if ERRSKEW is replaced by ERRVAR, model specification improves
(without control variables the adjusted R2 statistic increases from 1.99% to 2.58%). The signs of the
coefficients on ERRVAR are negative, as predicted if positive forecast errors are more costly to ana-
lysts than negative forecast errors. Results for models 2 and 5 indicate that the statistical significance
of ERRVAR remains, even after controlling for ERRSKEW, and despite the high correlation between
ERRVAR and ERRSKEW that would be expected to bias tstatistics towards zero.14 Note, however,
12 Breusch–Pagan (1979) tests reject the null of constant variance of residuals in all reported models.
13 We also examined the sensitivity of inferences to the use of the delete-group jackknife standard errors (Shao and Rao, 1993)
and to the use of exact critical values for robust standard errors obtained from the Wild bootstrap methodology (discussed
further below) and our results are robust under both approaches. Although critical values obtained from the bootstrap method-
ology are much higher than classical values, indicating that non-normality is a significant problem, the main inferences are
unchanged. Indeed, they are reinforced.
14 Despite the high univariate correlation between ERRVAR and ERRSKEW, all variance inflation factors in the multivariate
analyses were well under the commonly used threshold of 10 (e.g. Chatterjee and Price, 1977).
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that when ERRVAR is included in the model, the coefficient on ERRSKEW in models 2 and 5 becomes
insignificant, in contrast to the positive significant coefficients in models 3 and 6.
Generally, the estimates in Table II indicate that our results are not sensitive to inclusion of control
variables.15 Inferences regarding the significance of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW are identical for mod-
els 1–3 and for models 4–6; i.e. ERRVAR is always negative and significant, whereas ERRSKEW is
insignificant in the presence of ERRVAR. Therefore, in subsequent tests, we focus on models 1–3.
The estimated parameters for the control variables in models 4–6 are generally in line with the
findings in prior research. Forecast errors are positively related to firm size (as captured by lnMVAL)
in each of the reported models, suggesting that analysts are more optimistic when forecasting earnings
of smaller firms. We further examine this issue below. There are significant negative coefficients on
the analyst following variable (lnANFLL) and the loss variable (LOSS), both of which are consistent
with prior research (e.g. Gu and Wu, 2003). Like many previous studies (e.g. Abarbanell and Bernard,
1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999), there is also evidence of under-reaction to prior period earnings
changes—coefficients on both SUE1 and SUE2 are significant and positive in each of models 4–6.16
Overall, we interpret the results in Table II as providing strong support for our hypothesis that
analysts have asymmetric loss functions, rather than linear symmetric loss functions. If analysts’
loss functions are linear and symmetric, forecast errors should be a function of ERRSKEW but not
ERRVAR, whereas asymmetric loss should result in the statistical significance of ERRVAR. This is
exactly what we find in our results. Our results support the asymmetry in loss functions implied by
the findings of prior empirical literature on analysts’ incentives, i.e. that analysts are penalized more
for positive errors than negative errors. The results reported in Table II are based on a very large sam-
ple and unreported analysis reveals that they are extremely robust to various model specification and
variable measurement choices (see below).
Book-to-market and size portfolio analysis
In this section we show that the findings reported above extend to portfolios sorted on a priori deter-
minants of analyst forecast bias that are also correlates of forecast error variance and skewness. We
consider the relation between forecast errors and ERRVAR and ERSKEW for portfolios sorted on the
basis of book-to-market ratio and on market capitalization. If ERRVAR retains its ability to explain
within-portfolio forecast errors, this constitutes an even more powerful test of the asymmetric loss
function explanation.
We form portfolios on the basis of these stock characteristics first because they are the basis of com-
monly used investment styles—book-to-market ratio is a common characteristic for distinguishing
between value and glamour stocks. Doukas et al. (2002) show that analyst forecast bias differs signif-
icantly across portfolios sorted on these characteristics (although not in a direction capable of explain-
ing the irrational extrapolation hypothesis). Second, recent research suggests that book-to-market is a
useful instrument that captures the degree of accounting conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005) and
15 Our preferred model excludes the control variables, since models 1–3 emerge from our theoretical analysis. We report the
models with control variables only to permit comparison with prior research.
16 Based on the model of Barron et al. (1998), some prior studies (e.g. Gu and Wu, 2003) include cross-sectional dispersion
of the consensus forecast as a variable in their regressions to control for ‘forecast uncertainty’. We exclude this variable since
our predictions are based entirely on the moments of the forecast error. Furthermore, the model of Barron et al. rests on the
assumption of earnings being normally distributed (Barron et al., 1998, p. 423). However, when we estimate our regressions
on a subsample where dispersion does not exist (i.e. the standard deviation of the consensus forecast is zero), our results
still hold.
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that conservatism is an important determinant of the distributional properties of earnings and forecast
errors (e.g. Basu, 1997; Helbok and Walker, 2004).
We form one-way sorted portfolios each quarter based on beginning-of-quarter book-to-price and
on market capitalization. Table III confirms that forecast errors are indeed dramatically different
across book-to-market ratio and market capitalization portfolios (a one-way ANOVA tests revealed
that the differences between the groups formed on the basis of book to market and size are statistically
significant at p < 0.001). The mean values of ERROR lie between 0.017% for low book-to-market
stocks and -0.212% for high book-to-market stocks, indicating that the optimism bias is much higher
for high book-to-market stocks. Note also that the standard deviation of ERROR increases and the
negative skewness decreases monotonically across book-to-market portfolios. In contrast, the stock
level estimates of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW indicate that forecast error variance generally increases
with the book-to-market ratio and forecast error skewness is negative and on average decreases with
book-to-market. Similar patterns are observed across size-sorted portfolios. The degree of optimism
bias in forecasts is much higher for small firms, and ERRVAR decreases as firms become larger, as
does the extent to which ERRSKEW is negative. The patterns of ERRVAR and ERRSKEW across
characteristic portfolios are consistent with the observed forecast error bias.
In Table IV we estimate models 1–3 similarly to Table II, but for the one-way sorted portfolios. The
results are generally consistent with Table II.17 Panel A reports results for portfolios sorted on book-
to-market. The coefficient on ERRVAR when it is the sole independent variable is negative for all four
portfolios, as predicted by the asymmetric loss function explanation, and significant at the 1% level
in three of the four groups. Similarly, the coefficient on ERRSKEW in model 3 is consistently posi-
tive, and significant at the 5% level or better. When both ERRVAR and ERRSKEW are included in the
same regression (model 2), multicollinearity problems become somewhat more severe but ERRVAR
retains its significance for high book-to-market portfolios (i.e. portfolio BM4) where forecast bias is
greatest. In contrast, the sign on ERRSKEW changes from positive to negative across portfolios and
the coefficient is insignificantly different from zero in three of the four portfolios.
Results in Table IV, panel B, for size-sorted portfolios are similar. ERRVAR is negative and signifi-
cant (at the 5% level at least) for all portfolios in model 1, while ERRSKEW is positive and significant
at the 5% level for all but the largest firms, where it is significant at p < 0.10. When ERRVAR and
ERRSKEW are entered jointly, however, only ERRVAR is significant (in two cases at least the 5%
level). ERRSKEW is statistically insignificant in all four regressions. Again, multicollinearity appears
to present a problem for some portfolios, especially in the case of the larger firm portfolios, potentially
explaining why ERRVAR loses significance when ERRSKEW is added.
Overall, the results in Table IV confirm that the variance of forecast errors is a significant determi-
nant of forecast bias, even after first sorting firms into portfolios based on stock characteristics that
sharply discriminate between different levels of forecast bias and forecast error variance and skew-
ness. The persistent negative sign and continued significance of ERRVAR as an explanatory factor for
forecast errors supports earlier research conjecturing that analysts form their forecasts with reference
to asymmetric loss functions.
Robustness checks
The results we have reported are based on price-scaled forecast errors. We believe that there are
good reasons for scaling, based on considering the links between forecast errors and the costs
17 Additional (unreported) tests showed that the results in Table IV are not sensitive to the inclusion of the control variables.
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Table III. Summary statistics for book-to-market (BM) portfolios and size(S) portfolios
Panel A: Book-to-market portfolios
N Mean Median SD Skewness
ERROR
BM1 (low) 19,669 0.0168 0.0236 0.4277 4.65
BM2 19,669 0.0074 0.0229 0.4666 4.02
BM3 19,669 0.0290 0.0223 0.6061 3.28
BM4 (high) 19,668 0.2120 0.0000 1.2077 2.12
ERRVAR
BM1 (low) 19,669 0.0396 0.0007 0.2755 10.74
BM2 19,669 0.0364 0.0016 0.2552 11.71
BM3 19,669 0.0559 0.0038 0.3099 9.27
BM4 (high) 19,668 0.1703 0.0142 0.5500 4.88
ERRSKEW
BM1 (low) 19,669 0.0013 0.0000 0.0163 13.51
BM2 19,669 0.0013 0.0000 0.0154 13.96
BM3 19,669 0.0022 0.0000 0.0201 10.58
BM4 (high) 19,668 0.0071 0.0000 0.0354 5.75
Panel B: Size portfolios
N Mean Median SD Skewness
ERROR
S1 (small) 25,040 0.2651 0.0000 1.6156 2.88
S2 25,040 0.0498 0.0231 0.8563 4.51
S3 25,040 0.0107 0.0255 0.6767 5.63
S4 (large) 25,040 0.0151 0.0242 0.4932 7.33
ERRVAR
S1 (small) 25,040 0.2045 0.0135 0.6381 4.31
S2 25,040 0.0832 0.0041 0.4066 7.20
S3 25,040 0.0564 0.0023 0.3107 8.94
S4 (large) 25,040 0.0267 0.0009 0.2064 13.63
ERRSKEW
S1 (small) 25,040 0.0085 0.0000 0.0396 5.13
S2 25,040 0.0030 0.0000 0.0240 8.99
S3 25,040 0.0020 0.0000 0.0191 11.05
S4 (large) 25,040 0.0010 0.0000 0.0137 15.63
Notes:
ERROR is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly earnings issued within
90 days of the earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, multiplied by 100.
ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous eight quarters’ forecast errors, multiplied by 100.
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous eight quarters’ forecast errors, multiplied by 100.
BM represents book-to-market portfolios (where 1 is the lowest B/M quartile and 4 is the highest B/M quartile).
S represents size portfolios (where S1 comprises the quartile of smallest companies in the full sample and S4 comprises the
largest).
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borne by users of earnings forecasts (as pointed out in note 10 above). However, there is also evi-
dence suggesting that scaling may have perverse effects on the distributional properties of variables
(see, for example, Cohen and Lys, 2003; Durtschi and Easton, 2005; Lambert, 2004). For this rea-
son, we also employed the Wild bootstrap methodology to both price-scaled and unscaled data and
identified critical values for relevant test statistics (Davidson and Flachaire, 2001). This methodology
utilizes the distribution of the error term in the main estimating equation to simulate empirical con-
fidence intervals necessary to reject the null hypothesis when the null holds (see Clatworthy et al.,
2007). It provides a powerful test of statistical significance when the underlying regression error dis-
tribution is non-normal (Wu, 1986; Hardle and Mammen, 1993). Use of the Wild bootstrap can often
result in critical values differing dramatically from classical values. For example, according to our
estimates based on 10,000 iterations, critical values to allow rejection of the hypothesis that ERRVAR
is significantly different from zero are [-7.31] and [7.41] for p < 0.05 for unscaled data. Despite
such major departures from classical test statistic critical values, in unreported results we find that
after taking account of the bootstrapped critical values all the inferences drawn from the main results
reported in Table II remain intact (results are available from the authors upon request).
Table IV. Regressions of models 1–3 by book-to-market (BM) portfolios and size (S) portfolios
Panel A: Book-to-market portfolios
Model 1 Model 2
BM1 BM2 BM3 BM4 BM1 BM2 BM3 BM4
(low) (high) (low) (high)
Constant 0.0238 0.0093 0.0212 0.1679 0.0238 0.0074 0.0226 0.1655
(6.37)*** (2.31)** (3.74)*** (13.82)*** (6.35)*** (1.86)* (3.96)*** (13.60)***
ERRVAR 0.1789 0.0526 0.1397 0.2591 0.1746 0.1028 0.0586 0.3168
(2.86)*** (1.19) (2.96)*** (7.25)*** (1.54) (1.39) (0.69) (4.57)***
ERRSKEW — — — — 0.0876 3.0082 1.4171 1.0434
— — — — (0.05) (2.42)** (1.13) (0.98)
N 19,669 19,669 19,669 19,668 19,669 19,669 19,669 19,668
R2 0.0133 0.0008 0.0051 0.0139 0.0133 0.0034 0.0056 0.0142
F -value 8.18*** 1.42 8.75*** 52.62*** 4.09** 3.42** 5.09*** 26.89***
Panel B: Size portfolios
Model 1 Model 2
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
(small) (large) (small) (large)
Constant 0.1691 0.0288 0.0049 0.0183 0.1719 0.0295 0.0054 0.0184
(13.61)*** (4.23)*** (0.89) (3.98)*** (13.21)*** (4.31)*** (0.97) (4.16)***
ERRVAR 0.4698 0.2516 0.1032 0.1188 0.4066 0.2218 0.0707 0.1375
(8.72)*** (3.52)*** (2.02)** (2.03)** (3.64)*** (2.28)** (0.68) (1.58)
ERRSKEW — — — — 1.1963 0.6094 0.6652 0.3231
— — — — (0.70) (0.40) (0.43) (0.25)
N 25,040 25,040 25,040 25,040 25,040 25,040 25,040 25,040
R2 0.0344 0.0143 0.0022 0.0025 0.0347 0.0144 0.0024 0.0025
F -value 76.01*** 12.40*** 4.09** 4.14** 40.29*** 6.23*** 2.91* 2.24
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Table IV. Continued
Panel A: Book-to-market portfolios
Model 3
BM1 BM2 BM3 BM4
(low) (high)
Constant 0.0201 0.0093 0.0241 0.1894
(5.25)*** (2.28)** (4.25)*** (15.13)***
ERRVAR — — — —
— — — —
ERRSKEW 2.5280 1.5479 2.2127 3.1948
(2.37)** (2.13)** (3.17)*** (5.80)***
N 19,669 19,669 19,669 19,668
R2 0.0092 0.0026 0.0054 0.0087
F -value 5.60** 4.52** 10.04*** 33.63***
Panel B: Size portfolios
Model 3
S1 S2 S3 S4
(small) (large)
Constant 0.2079 0.0387 0.0076 0.0166
(15.98)*** (5.76)*** (1.29) (3.51)***
ERRVAR — — — —
— — — —
ERRSKE 6.7617 3.7251 1.5776 1.4908
W (8.17)*** (3.21)*** (2.27)** (1.74)*
N 25,040 25,040 25,040 25,040
R2 0.0275 0.0109 0.0020 0.0017
F -value 66.80*** 10.33*** 5.17** 3.04*
Note: Models are as reported in columns 1–3 in Table II. S represents size portfolio, where S1 comprises the quartile of small-
est companies in the full sample (N D 100, 160), while S4 comprises the largest. BM represents book-to-market portfolio,
where BM1 comprises the lowest quartile of companies with data available (N = 78,675), while BM4 comprises the highest.
Dependent variable (ERROR) is actual quarterly earnings taken from I/B/E/S minus the median of all forecasts of quarterly
earnings issued within 90 days of the earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, multi-
plied by 100. ERRVAR is the second moment of the price-deflated previous eight quarters’ forecast errors, multiplied by 100.
ERRSKEW is the third moment of the price-deflated previous eight quarters’ forecast errors, multiplied by 100. Asterisks indi-
cate statistical significance at the ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.10 level respectively; absolute t -statistics based on firm-clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
Like many other forecast data providers, in order to make data comparable over time, I/B/E/S
retrospectively adjusts earnings and forecast data to take account of stock splits and round to the
nearest cent. This procedure has been shown to induce conservative measures of forecast errors for
firms encountering numerous splits (Baber and Kang, 2002), though it is less problematic for the
I/B/E/S Detail Files used in our analysis (Payne and Thomas, 2003). Nevertheless, in order to assess
whether this issue affects our results we repeated our analysis on I/B/E/S unadjusted data and our
conclusions remain unchanged. Our results also hold when using the most recent forecast, rather than
the consensus forecast for each firm quarter.
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As a further robustness check, we estimated models 1–6 using Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions.
Whereas our main results using standard errors clustered by firm control for possible time series cor-
relation of residuals within companies, the Fama–MacBeth standard errors allow for cross-sectional
dependence (i.e. correlations across firms; see Keane and Runkle, 1998). The results (not reported)
are again consistent with those reported in Table II and IV. We also employed least absolute deviation
(LAD) regression and this yielded results generally consistent with those reported in the tables. The
coefficient on ERRVAR is consistently significantly negative, though the coefficient on ERRSKEW is
positive and significant—both with and without the control variables. Although we have no economic
rationale for using LAD regression in this context, it still provides a useful robustness test, especially
in the presence of data that are known to be non-normally distributed (e.g. Lambert, 2004).
Because of suggestions in prior research that the analysts’ loss function parameters may have
changed over time, we also conducted our main analysis on separate time periods. More specif-
ically, Hong and Kubik (2003) and Richardson et al. (2004) note that the institutional character-
istics which lead us to our prediction of asymmetric loss were more pronounced in the 1990s.
Furthermore, regulatory changes in the investment industry, coupled with the significant legal
settlements with large investment banks that took place at the beginning of the century were
designed to increase the costs of issuing biased forecasts and advice (see, for example, Brad-
shaw, 2009a, 2009b, and Barniv et al., 2009). We therefore estimated our regressions for five-year
periods from 1985 onwards and found that the coefficient on ERRVAR is smallest in the period
2000–2005, where regulatory attention to conflicts of interest was highest. More specifically, our
estimate of the coefficient 1 on ERRVAR in model 2 is negative and statistically significant in all
periods, except the period 2000–2005, though, as noted by Bradshaw (2009a), we interpret these
results with caution since we are not able to unequivocally attribute the observed changes directly to
the regulatory changes occurring in that sub-period.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we test whether analysts’ earnings forecasts are consistent with their loss functions
being asymmetric. Research based on data from a variety of countries consistently finds evidence of
bias and inefficiency in analysts’ forecasts of earnings (e.g. Brown, 1993; Capstaff et al., 1995, 1998,
2001). Whether one can conclude that this represents evidence of irrationality requires knowledge of
the shape of analysts’ loss function (Keane and Runkle, 1998). Some studies have examined the pos-
sibility that such findings are attributable to an inappropriate assumption of a quadratic loss function,
and concludes that analysts’ objective is to minimize the mean absolute forecast error, rather than
mean squared error (Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004). The mean absolute error loss func-
tion penalizes forecast optimism and pessimism equally and the respective explanation for forecast
bias is skewness in the distribution of earnings. However, numerous empirical studies suggest that
analysts’ motives may be driven by the costs associated with under-predicting earnings being higher
than the costs of over-predicting earnings, i.e. asymmetric loss functions. Asymmetric loss functions
may result from incentives to gain access to management and/or more favourable career prospects for
analysts who are systematically optimistic (e.g., Lim, 2001; Hong and Kubik, 2003).
Under the symmetric linear (MAE) loss function, the expected forecast error is a function only of
forecast error skewness. In contrast, under asymmetric loss functions, ex post error is also a function
of error variance. Our results indicate that the symmetric linear loss function can be rejected in favour
of asymmetric loss functions. We find that earnings forecast errors are more strongly related to prior
forecast error variance than to skewness, indicating that analysts have asymmetric loss functions.
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Furthermore, the sign on error variance (and hence the direction of the asymmetry) is consistent with
a priori expectations from prior research (e.g. Lim, 2001; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Jackson, 2005)
showing that the effects of analysts’ institutional incentives are to encourage optimistic forecasts.
Our results have potentially important implications for the interpretation of analysts’ earnings fore-
casts by investors. The assumption that analysts’ objectives are solely to minimize forecast error might
be inappropriate. As pointed out by Lambert (2004), it is investors’, rather than analysts’, loss func-
tions that are ultimately most important in determining security prices. However, to the extent that
analysts’ forecasts influence investors’ decision making, an understanding of the shape of analysts’
loss function is necessary to enable investors to consider adjustment for potential biases.
A limitation of our research design, like those used in prior empirical research into analysts’ loss
functions, is that it is only able to capture aggregate effects and assumes that the consensus is rep-
resentative of the ‘marginal’ analyst. Our design also prevents us from tracking possible changes in
loss function parameters over the forecast horizon, even though there is evidence to suggest that they
may not be constant (e.g. Richardson et al., 2004). Further research could seek to address such issues
in order to identify factors that may cause the extent of the asymmetry in analysts’ loss functions to
vary, as suggested by Ramnath et al. (2008), perhaps using alternative approaches, such as those set
out in Elliott et al. (2005) and Patton and Timmermann (2007b).
APPENDIX
Expanding the Linex function (1) to a fourth-order Taylor approximation we obtain
L D .e












Noting that x  y  f and minimizing L with respect to the forecast, we obtain
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If ˛ > 0 then Z becomes more negative—and hence optimism bias increases—as the forecast error
variance increases. In other words, the degree of optimism is a positive function of the forecast error
variance. This is consistent with the closed-form result of Christofferson and Diebold (1996, 1997)
in expression (3).















3" D 0 (A.5)
If the sum of the last two terms in (A.5) is positive, then the equation has two complex roots and
one real root. By inspection, ceteris paribus, irrespective of the sign of ˛, Z is a negative function of
3" (and optimism bias is a positive function of 3" /.
In other words, the signs on the coefficients on both forecast error variance and forecast error
skewness should be negative for ˛ > 0. Note that if forecast error skewness is negative, skewness will
partially offset the optimism bias induced by forecast error variance. However, generally, the marginal
impact of skewness will be dominated by the variance effect when j˛j < 1.
Note that while the above analysis has been conducted in the context of the Linex loss function, it
is applicable to any continuous asymmetric loss function that is expandable to order four. Such cases
will generate a quartic expression analogous to expression (A.1) and hence forecast error variance
and skewness will be determinants of bias.
It should be noted also that this analysis also implies that for some symmetric loss functions,
forecast error variance and skewness will also be determinants of bias when forecast errors exhibit





In this case Z is obtained as a solution to the equation
3" C 32" Z C Z3 D 0 (A.7)
Given this, strictly interpreted, our empirical finding that both variance and skewness are signifi-
cant determinants of forecast bias only implies inconsistency with the MAE loss function. However,
arguments for a symmetric, non-quadratic loss function other than the MAE form have, as yet, not
been proposed, to the best of our knowledge.
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